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Abstract
This paper considers the screening problem faced by a monopolist of a network good in a
general setting. We demonstrate that the joint presence of asymmetric information and net-
work externalities revise the “no distortion on the top” and “one-way distortion” principle.
The pattern of consumption distortions crucially depends on the congestion of the network.
It exhibits one-way distortion in un-congestible network and two-way distortion in congestible
network. The countervailing incentives problem from potential entry threat is also analyzed.
As the competitiveness of the outside competitors increases, the incumbent firm should ad-
just its nonlinear pricing scheme accordingly, which will distort the allocations of both types.
Keywords: Nonlinear pricing, network externalities, countervailing incentives, type-dependent
reservation utility
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number : D42, D62, D82
1 Introduction
Two prevailing rules in the classical adverse selection model are “no distortion on the top”
and “one-way distortions for less efficient types”, which means under asymmetric information,
the most efficient agent has the first-best allocation, all the other types have allocations lower
than the first-best one. These rules were supported by many seminal studies such as those in
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Maskin and Riley (1984), Baron and Myerson (1982), Mussa and Rosen (1978), Myerson (1981),
etc. However, these rules may not be true in the presence of externalities or in the case where
the agents face countervailing incentives. In this paper, we will discuss both the cases in a
nonlinear pricing environment.
An externality is present whenever the well-being of a consumer or the production possibil-
ities of a firm are directly affected by the actions of another in the economy. In consumption
sectors, externalities arise whenever a person’s utility function includes arguments controlled by
the other consumers. Among all forms of consumption externalities, network externality is the
most typical one. It is defined as a change in the benefit, or surplus, that an agent derives from
a good when the total consumption of the same kind of goods changes. Such a phenomenon
might arise for any of a number of reasons: because the usefulness of the product depends
directly on the size of the network (e.g., telephones, fax machines); or because of bandwagon
effect, which means the desire to be in style: to have a good because almost everyone else has
it; or indirectly through the availability of complementary goods and services (often known as
the “hardware-software paradigm” ) or of postpurchase services (e.g., for automobiles).
Most studies on consumption externalities in principal-agent setup find that “no distortion
on the top” rule does not hold any more, but the consumptions still exhibit “one-way distor-
tion”. Hahn (2003) built a model of telecommunication to examine the role of call and network
externalities in nonlinear pricing. He concludes that in equilibrium all types end up with sub-
optimal quantities. And he attributes this result to the existence of call externalities which
is the benefit of incoming calls to a subscriber who does not have to pay for the calls. Segal
(1999, 2003) developed a general model of contracting with externalities and characterize the
nature of the arising inefficiencies. When externalities are positive, he shows that each agent’s
consumption level is smaller in the resulting equilibrium allocation than in the socially efficient
one. Strategic complementarity is identified as the factor accounting for this result. However,
his analysis makes two additional assumptions that are useful in identifying the direction of dis-
tortions: first, the consumers are identical, and second, total welfare depends only on aggregate
trade and not on its allocation across consumers. Csorba (2008) showed that under-consumption
result holds even without these two assumptions if externalities are positive. Still based on the
critical assumption of strategic complementarity, he builds a general model to describe and solve
the screening problem faced by the monopolist of a network good. Applying monotone com-
parative static tools, he demonstrates that the joint presence of asymmetric information and
positive network effects leads to a strict downward distortion for all consumers in the quantities
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provided.
Another revise to the “no distortion on the top” and “one-way distortion” rules arises when
agents face countervailing incentives. When the reservation utility of an agent, as well as his
cost of acting for the principal, depend on his private information, the low-type agents may have
incentives to choose the contract menu of the high-type agents. Lewis and Sappington (1989)
termed this phenomenon “countervailing incentives” and give a pioneering study on this issue.
They showed when the fixed cost of a regulated firm is type-dependent, its payoff function is not
monotone on the whole interval of types, and the agent can be tempted to overstate his private
information for some of his realizations and to understate it for others. The performance can
be distorted both above and below the efficient level. Maggi and Rodriguee-Clare (1995) gave
a complete analysis of the principal-agent problem with countervailing incentives. They show
that the pattern of the two-way distortion depends crucially on whether the reservation utility
of the agent is convex or concave in his private information. If it is concave or mildly convex
function, then the low-type agent’s output is distorted downward, and high-type agent’s output
is distorted upward. If the reservation utility is strongly convex, then the opposite is the case.
This paper analyzes the nonlinear pricing problem faced by an entry-deterring monopolist
seller under asymmetric information and network externalities. We first show that the one-way
distortion results in Segal (1999, 2003), and Csorba (2008) depend on the complementarity be-
tween consumers. If the consumers are rivals or substitutes to each other, the one-way distortion
results are not true in general. In the presence of network externalities, the congestion of net-
work accounts for the substitutability between consumers. All the participants in a network
interlinked with each other in two aspects: first, everyone benefits from others’ consumption;
second, they are rivals to each other in the process of competing for limited network resource.
For example, all the internet subscriber benefit from increasing number of new subscribers with
whom they can share information with. One the other hand, they may also suffer from network
jam because of bandwidth limit. If the former effect dominates, the network is “un-congestible”.
If the latter one dominate, it is “congestible”. In this paper, we give a full characterization of the
pattern of distortions in the presence of network externalities. We show that the one-way distor-
tion attained by Segal (1999, 2003) and Csorba (2008) presents if the network is un-congestible.
However, the consumption exhibits two-way distortion if the network is congestible.1
1Lockwood (2003) studied the production externalities problem in a principal-agent model and a similar two-
way distortion result. In his model, the cost of any agent depends positively on the output offered by the other
agents. It is shown that the optimal contract for the principal exhibits two-way distortion: the output of any
agent is oversupplied (relative to the first-best) when his marginal cost of effort is low, and undersupplied when
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We also consider the distortion way under co-existence of the network externalities and the
countervailing incentives problems. Although both factors can revise the “no distortion on the
top” and “one-way distortion” rule, the joint presence of them makes the distortion pattern
in the nonlinear pricing contract more complicated, which, to our knowledge, has been little
studied in the existing literature. Facing the outside market, consumers can choose to bypass
the network of incumbent firm and switch to buying from outside competitors, it results in type-
dependent reservation utilities of consumers, which is the causality of countervailing incentives
problem.
In the classical countervailing incentives research such as Lewis and Sappington (1989) and
Maggi and Rodriguee-Clare (1995), the nature of optimal contract depends crucially on the
shape of reservation utility function. In this paper, we show that the shape of reservation utility
function is in turn determined by the marginal cost of outside competitors. As such, the incum-
bent firm should adjust its nonlinear pricing contract according to the cost of potential entrants,
which means that competitors with different competitiveness pose different degree of threat to
the incumbent firm. Laffont and Tirole (1990) also discussed the problem of optimal network by-
passing in a natural monopolist regulation economic environment. In the presence of bypass, the
monopolist may have to offer advantageous term to high-demand consumers in order to retain
them. This may lead low-demand consumers to consume high-demanded consumers’ bundle.
They discussed the “upward-binding” incentive constraints and countervailing incentives prob-
lem. However, in Laffont and Tirole (1990), the good displays no network externalities although
the regulated firm is in network industry. There is thus no interaction between different types’
consumption. While in our model, the consumptions of different types are “interdependent”
through the network.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up economic environments
and gives the benchmark result without network externalities. Section 3 considers the design
of optimal nonlinear pricing contract in the presence of network externalities. Section 4 dis-
cusses network bypassing and countervailing incentives problem. Finally, concluding remarks
are offered in Section 5.
his marginal cost of effort is high. A critical assumption underling this result requires a non-increasing marginal
cost of effort which is satisfied when agents operate production process with non-decreasing return to scale. This
condition is analogous to the “substitutability” or “congestion” condition in our model.
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2 Economic environments
Consider a principal-agent model in which the principal is a monopolist of a network good
with marginal production cost c and total output q. The principal’s payoff function is given by
V = t− cq, where t is the payment received from consumers.
Consumers have heterogenous preferences for the good, suppose there are n different types
of consumers, so that θ1 < θ2 < · · · < θn and let Θ denote the set of different types. Let
f(θi) represents the proportion of θi type consumers in the whole population. Denoted by
∆θ ≡ θi − θi−1 > 0 the difference of adjacent types and F (θi) =
∑
j6i f(θj), the cumulative
frequency. Then by Law of Large Numbers, it is mathematically equivalent to the framework
with a single agent whose type θ is distributed with c.d.f F (·) and p.d.f f(·) on Θ = {θ1, · · · , θn}.
A consumer of θi type is assumed to have an utility function of Ui = θiV (qi) + Ψ(Q) − ti,
where qi is the amount of the network good he consumes, Q =
∑
i f(θi)qi is the total amount of
network good in the economy (network size) and ti is the tariff charged for qi by the principal.
The utility function can be divided into two terms addictively: θiV (qi) is the intrinsic value
of consuming, while Ψ(Q) is the network value. Note that, we assume the network effect is
homogeneous among all the consumers, namely, the network value is independent of individual
preference θi and individual consumption qi.
It is assumed that V ′(q) > 0 and V ′′(q) < 0. The congestion of network is defined by the
sign of Ψ′′(Q).
Definition 1 The network is congestible if and only if Ψ′′(Q) < 0.
Remark 1 If the network capacity is large and the maintaining technology is advanced enough,
an increase in one consumer’s consumption will increase the marginal utilities of others, and so
Ψ′′(Q) > 0. On the contrary, if network capacity and maintaining technology are limited,
consumers are rivals to each other in the sense that an increase in one consumer’s consumption
will decrease the marginal utilities of others, and thus Ψ′′(Q) < 0.
The objective of the monopolist is to design a menu of incentive-compatible and self-selecting
quantity-price pairs {q(θˆ), t(θˆ)} to maximize his own revenue, where θˆ ∈ Θ is the consumer’s
announcement. The timing of contracting is given by the following procedures:
• Stage 1. The consumers observe their own “type” θ.
• Stage 2. The monopolist announces their quantity and pricing schedule {q(θˆ), t(θˆ)}.
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• Stage 3. Based on her type θ, each consumer determines her optimal announcement:
θˆ = argmax
τ
{θV (q(τ))+Ψ(Q)− t(τ)} subject to her individual rationality constraint (IR):
θV (q) + Ψ(Q)− t > Uˆ(θ), where Uˆ(θ) is her reservation utility.2
• Stage 4. The monopolist gets payoff of Eθ∈Θ
[
t(θ) − cq(θ)] and each consumer gets her
information rent.
If the monopolist offers the same menu of contracts for all consumers, a consumer may
have an incentive to mimic the other types. As in the standard adverse selection model, an
incentive-compatible menu {qi, ti}ni=1 should satisfy participation constraints (IRi) and incen-
tives constraints (ICij):
IRi : θiV (qi) + Ψ(Q)− ti > 0
ICij : θiV (qi) + Ψ(Q)− ti > θiV (qj) + Ψ(Q)− tj
or equivalently, written in the form of information rents as:
IRi : Ui > 0
ICij : Ui > Uj + (θi − θj)V (qj),∀i, j,
where the reservation utilities of the consumers are normalized to be zero.
In the absence of network externalities (Ψ(Q) = 0), the standard problem of the monopolist
is: 
max
{ti,qi}
{
n∑
i=1
f(θi) (ti − cqi)
}
s.t. IRi : θiV (qi)− ti > 0
ICij : θiV (qi)− ti > θiV (qj)− tj ,∀i, j
or equivalently,
(P1)

max
{Ui,qi}
{
n∑
i=1
f(θi)
[
θiV (qi)− cqi
]− n∑
i=1
f(θi)Ui
}
s.t. IRi : Ui > 0
ICij : Ui > Uj + (θi − θj)V (qj), ∀i, j
We first analyze the set of constraints to find the binding ones.
2Note that, because of a continuum of consumers, the individual misreport has no effect on the total consump-
tion Q.
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Lemma 1 In the second-best optimal contract there are n binding constraints: the individual
rationality constraint of the lowest-type consumer is binding, and the incentive constraints are
binding for i = 2, 3, . . . , n.
Proof. See Appendix.
Applying Lemma 1, in the absence of network externalities, we get the benchmark MR
(Maskin-Riley) contract from (P1):3
[
θi −H(θi)
]
V ′(qMRi ) = c,∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} (1)
and
UMR1 = 0, U
MR
i =
i−1∑
j=1
∆θV (qMRj ), ∀i > 2 (2)
where H(θ) = 1−F (θ)f(θ) ∆θ, and
1−F (θ)
f(θ) is the reciprocal hazard rate of distribution F (θ).
It is easy to check that if the monotone hazard rate condition H ′(θ) 6 0 is satisfied, qMRi <
qMRi+1 ; q
MR
i < q
∗
i ,∀i < n and qMRn = q∗n, where q∗i are the first-best outputs that are obtained
from θiV ′(q∗i ) = c. It is clear that under asymmetric information the consumptions of all types
except the one with highest willing to pay will be distorted downward, which is consistent with
the rules “no distortion on the top” and “one-way distortion” .
3 Economies with network externalities
3.1 Two-type case
In this subsection, we assume that Θ = {θ, θ},Pr(θ = θ) = v,Pr(θ = θ) = 1− v, the network
magnitude is thus Q = vq+ (1− v)q. Under complete information, the monopolist’s problem is:
max
{(t,q);(t,q)}
v(t− cq) + (1− v)(t− cq)
s.t. IR(θ) : θV (q) + Ψ(Q)− t > 0
IR(θ) : θV (q) + Ψ(Q)− t > 0.
or equivalently,
(P2)

max
{(U,q);(U,q)}
v
[
θV (q)− cq
]
+ (1− v)
[
θV (q)− cq
]
+Ψ(Q)−
[
vU + (1− v)U
]
s.t. IR(θ) : U > 0
IR(θ) : U > 0
3It is assumed that θi −H(θi) > 0,∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} to guarantee that qi > 0.
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The first-best consumption is thus:
θV ′(qFB) + Ψ′
(
vqFB + (1− v)qFB) = c,
θV ′(qFB) + Ψ′
(
vqFB + (1− v)qFB) = c. (3)
Under asymmetric information, two incentive compatible constraints should be added to the
above program, then we get:
(P3)

max
{(U,q);(U,q)}
v
[
θV (q)− cq
]
+ (1− v)
[
θV (q)− cq
]
+Ψ(Q)−
[
vU + (1− v)U
]
s.t. IR(θ) : U > 0
IR(θ) : U > 0
IC(θ) : U > U −∆θV (q)
IC(θ) : U > U +∆θV (q)
From Lemma 1, the downward incentive constraint IC(θ) and the participation constraint
of the low-demand type IR(θ) are binding, then the consumptions in the second-best contract
are characterized by the following first-order conditions:

(
θ − 1− v
v
∆θ
)
V ′(qSB) + Ψ′
(
vqSB + (1− v)qSB) = c,
θV ′(qSB) + Ψ′
(
vqSB + (1− v)qSB) = c. (4)
We synthesize the first-best and second-best solution by considering them as solution to the
following parameterized form:
max
{q,q}
Π(q, q, α) (5)
where
Π(q, q, α) = v
[
αV (q)− cq]+ (1− v)[θV (q)− cq]+Ψ(Q).
Note that we have the first-best contract given in (3) when α = θ, and the second-best contract
given in (4) when α = θ − 1−vv ∆θ.
We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the presence of network externalities and asymmetric information, if V ′(q) >,
V ′′(q) < 0, the Hessian matrix Πqq is negative definite at the solution to (5) for all α ∈
[θ − 1−vv ∆θ, θ], the direction of distortion in consumptions depends on whether the network
is congestible, namely, the sign of Ψ′′(Q).
1. If Ψ′′(Q) > 0, qSB < qFB and qSB < qFB. Consequently, the consumption exhibits one
way distortion: the second-best consumption is smaller than the first-best one for all types.
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2. If Ψ′′(Q) < 0, qSB < qFB and qSB > qFB. Consequently, the consumption exhibits two-
way distortion: the consumption of the low demand consumers is distorted downward,
while that of the high demand consumers is distorted upward.
For both cases, the network magnitude is downsized: QSB < QFB.
Proof. See Appendix.
The result can be interpreted as follows. In order to minimize the information rent captured
by the high-type consumer, the allocation of low-type agent should be lowered relative to the
first-best level. This is the basic trade off between allocation efficiency and rent extraction in
the standard adverse selection settings. In contrast to the canonical setting, the consumptions
of different consumers in our model interact through network effects. If the network is un-
congestible, they are complementary in the sense that the consumptions of high type agent is
also distorted downward. On the contrary, if the network is congestible, the consumers in the
network are rivalry, then the consumption of the high-type consumers is distorted upward to
counteract the decrease in that of the low type.
3.2 Multi-type case
In this subsection we extend the model to economic environments with more than two types of
agents. Under complete information, similar to the case of two types, the first-best consumptions
are:
θiV
′(qi) + Ψ′(Q) = c ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. (6)
Under asymmetric information, with the incentive compatible constraints and participation
constraints, the monopolist’s optimization program can be represented as:
(P4)

max
{Ui,qi}
{
n∑
i=1
f(θi)
[
θiV (qi)− cqi
]
+Ψ
(
n∑
i=1
f(θi)qi
)
−
n∑
i=1
f(θi)Ui
}
s.t. IRi : Ui > 0,
ICij : Ui > Uj + (θi − θj)V (qj), ∀i, j.
From Lemma 1 we have Ui = ∆θ
∑i−1
j=1 V (qj). Then the principal’s objective function in (P4)
can be rewritten as:
n∑
i=1
[
θi − 1− F (θi)
f(θi)
∆θ
]
f(θi)V (qi) + Ψ
(
n∑
i=1
f(θi)qi
)
− c
n∑
i=1
f(θi)qi (7)
The first-best and second-best consumptions can thus be regarded as the solutions to the
following unconstrained program parameterized on ²:
max
q∈Rn+
Π(q, ²) (8)
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where
Π(q, ²) =
n∑
i=1
[
θi + ²H(θi)
]
f(θi)V (qi) + Ψ
(
n∑
i=1
f(θi)qi
)
− c
n∑
i=1
f(θi)qi
with q = (q1, q2, · · · , qn) ∈ Rn+ and ² ∈ [−1, 0]. If ² = 0 the solution to (8) is the first-best
contract; if ² = −1 it is the second-best contract characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If the weak monotone hazard rate condition ddθ
[
1−F (θ)
f(θ)
]
6 0 is satisfied, and the
Hessian matrix Πqq is negative definite at
(
qSB1 , q
SB
2 , · · · , qSBn
)
for ² = −1, then the second-best
consumptions qSBi satisfy[
θi −H(θi)
]
V ′(qi) + Ψ′
(
n∑
i=1
f(θi)qi
)
= c,∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} (9)
the second-best information rents are
USB1 = 0, U
SB
i = ∆θ
i−1∑
j=1
V (qSBj ),∀i ∈ {2, 3, · · · , n} (10)
the second-best tariffs are
t1 = θ1V (qSB1 ) + Ψ
(
n∑
i=1
f(θi)qSBi
)
;
ti = θiV (qSBi )−∆θ
i−1∑
j=1
V (qSBj ) + Ψ
(
n∑
i=1
f(θi)qSBi )
)
, ∀i ∈ {2, 3, · · · , n}.
(11)
Proof. See Appendix.
Similarly, we now give the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that V ′(·) > 0, V ′′(·) < 0, the weakly monotone hazard rate property
d
dθ
[
1−F (θ)
f(θ)
]
6 0 holds, and Hessian matrix Πqq is negative definite for all q ∈ Rn+ and ² ∈ [−1, 0].
Then distortion way of consumptions depends on the sign of Ψ′′(Q).
1. If the network is un-congestible, Ψ′′(Q) > 0, then the consumption exhibits one-way dis-
tortion: qSBi < q
FB
i , ∀i
2. If the network is congestible, Ψ′′(Q) < 0, it exhibits two-way distortion. That means there
exists a threshold value i∗ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, for i > i∗, qSBi > qFBi ; for i < i∗, qSBi < qFBi .
In both cases the network magnitude will be downsized: QSB < QFB.
Proof. See Appendix.
The first conclusion of Proposition 3 is in line with the main conclusion in Hahn (2003), Segal
(1999, 2003), and Csorba (2008). Ψ′′(·) > 0 implies that the marginal value from an increase in
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individual consumption is higher at a higher level of others’ consumption : ∂
2Ui
∂qi∂qj
> 0,∀i 6= j.
Its interpretation is that the externalities in bigger network is larger than in small network, so
an agent is more eager to consume more when other agent consume more. It is consistent with
the critical “strategic conplementarity” assumption in Segal (1999,2003) and Csorba (2008).
This condition allows us to characterize the optimal contracts in a general setting by applying
monotone comparative static tools, pioneered by Topkis (1978) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994)
without solving equation (21) in appendix D explicitly.4 The second conclusion of the above
proposition is new. For every type θi, the principal has incentive to lower his consumption to
reduce the information rent accrued to more efficient agents with type θ > θi; on the other
hand, the principal also has an incentive to raise every type’s consumption to increase the whole
network value. If the network is un-congestible, the rent-reducing incentive dominates for all
types, so everyone’s consumptions is lower than the first-best case; if the network is congestible,
for the high type consumers, the network- value-increasing incentive dominates, while for the
low type consumers the rent-reducing incentive dominates, so two-way distortion is the outcome.
4 Entry Deterrence in Congestible Network: The Countervail-
ing Incentives Problem
In this section we discuss another causality for the failure of “no distortion on the top” and
“one-way distortion” rules. That is the countervailing incentive problem faced by agents. We
assume that the consumers can bypass the network offered by the incumbent firm and enter a
competitive market including many homogenous firms. All these firms are the potential entrants
of the market. Let ω denote the marginal production cost of the entrants. We assume that the
goods or services offered by the entrants are incompatible with that of the incumbent monopolist,
5 and they have not yet formed their own consumers network. In the competitive outside market,
each firm’s unit charge equals its marginal cost ω, so the representative consumer’s utility derived
from consuming the entrants’ goods is U(q) = θV (q)− ωq. Let G(θ) = maxq [θV (q)− ωq]. For
simplicity, we discuss the two-type case in this section, define G = G(θ), G = G(θ), and
∆G = G−G.
4By Topkis (1978) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994), a twice continuously differentiable function Π =
Π(q1, q2, · · · , qn; ²) defined on a lattice Q is supermodular if and only if for all i 6= j, ∂2Π∂qi∂qj > 0; furthermore,
if ∂
2Π
∂qi∂²
> 0,∀i, then function Π has strictly increasing differences in (q, ²). Let q(²) = max
q∈Q
Π(q, ²). Then for a
supermodular function with increasing differences in (q, ²), qi(²) is a strictly increasing function of ² for all i.
5Otherwise, the entrants can share the present network with the incumbent monopolist.
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We assume that the network is congestible : Ψ′′(·) < 0. Besides, all the regular conditions
V ′(·) > 0, V ′′(·) < 0 and negative definiteness of Hessian matrix Πqq in Proposition 1 are still
satisfied.
The entry threat gives the consumers non-zero type-dependent reservation utilities, and thus
the problem of the incumbent network supplier can be represented as
(P5)

max
{(U,q);(U,q)}
v
[
θV (q)− cq
]
+ (1− v)
[
θV (q)− cq
]
+Ψ(Q)−
[
vU + (1− v)U
]
s.t. IR(θ) : U > G
IR(θ) : U > G
IC(θ) : U > U −∆θV (q)
IC(θ) : U > U +∆θV (q).
Note that (P5) is the same as (P3) except for the non-zero type-dependent reservation utilities
G and G. The following proposition characterizes the optimal entry deterrence contract.
Proposition 4 The optimal entry-deterring contract depends on the marginal cost of potential
entrant. Specifically, there exist positive values ω1 < ω2 < ω3 < ω4 such that,
1. If ω > ω4, then ∆G < ∆θV (qSB), and consequently the pricing contract is:
q = qSB, q = qSB, U = G, and U = G+∆θV (qSB).
2. If ω3 6 ω 6 ω4, then ∆θV (qSB) 6 ∆G 6 ∆θV (qFB), and consequently the
optimal consumption level q and q are determined by
q = V −1
(
∆G
∆θ
)
θV ′(q) + Ψ′
(
vq + (1− v)q) = c, (12)
where q ∈ [qSB, qFB] and q ∈ [qFB, qSB]. The consumers’ information rents are
U = G and U = G.
3. If ω2 < ω < ω3, then ∆θV (qFB) < ∆G < ∆θV (qFB), and consequently the
pricing contract is q = qFB, q = qFB, U = G, and U = G.
4. If ω1 6 ω 6 ω2, then ∆θV (qFB) 6 ∆G 6 ∆θV (qCI), and consequently the
optimal consumption level q and q are given by
q = V −1
(
∆G
∆θ
)
θV ′(q) + Ψ′
(
vq + (1− v)q) = c, (13)
12
where q ∈ [qCI , qFB] and q ∈ [qFB, qCI ].6 The consumers’ information rents are
U = G and U = G.
5. If 0 < ω < ω1, then ∆G > ∆θV (qCI), and consequently the optimal contract is
q = qCI , q = qCI , U = G−∆θV (qCI), U = G. qCI and qCI are given by:
θV ′(qCI) + Ψ′
(
vqCI + (1− v)qCI) = c(
θ +
v
1− v∆θ
)
V ′(qCI) + Ψ′
(
vqCI + (1− v)qCI) = c. (14)
Proof. See Appendix
Remark 2 When ω > ω4, the second best contract is also entry deterring. It means that when
the outside competitors are not efficient enough to give high demand consumers enough utility
exceeding their information rents acquired from the present network, the outside market is only
attractive to low demand consumers. The incumbent firm need not to change its pricing contract
when facing the entry threat of a firm with low competitiveness.
When ω3 6 ω 6 ω4, we have q ∈
[
qSB, qFB
]
and q ∈ [qFB, qSB]. That means when the
marginal cost ω decreases to the extent that the utility difference ∆G is large enough to attract
high demand consumers bypassing the present network, the monopolist must give up more
information rent to him by increasing the consumption level of low demand consumers. The
consumption level of high demand consumers themselves should also be lowered accordingly
because of network effects. In this case, the sharper competitiveness of outside competitors
makes the allocations less distorted in a sense that they are closer to the first best outcome than
the second best outcome.
When ω2 < ω < ω3, asymmetric information imposes no distortion on both types’ allocation.
As ω decreases and ∆G increases further, q will reach the first best level, it is suboptimal for
the monopolist to increase the high type consumers’ information rent at the cost of distorting
the consumption level of the low demand consumers upward. In this case, the main task for the
firm toward the high type consumers is to prevent them from bypassing the incumbent market
instead of preventing them from misreporting, the participation constraints are more difficult to
be satisfied than the incentive compatible constraints. Thus only the IRs are binding, and the
first best allocation is attained.
When ω1 6 ω 6 ω2, we have q ∈ [qCI , qFB] and q ∈ [qFB, qCI ]. The high difference of
utilities induces the low type consumers to pretend to be a high type, from which the counter-
vailing incentives problem arises. The IC(θ), IR(θ) and IR(θ) in (P5) are binding. Again, the
6“ CI ” denotes “ countervailing incentives ”.
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allocations of the two types will be distorted in opposite directions. But it is different from the
distortions in cases 1 and 2. In these cases, the monopolist distorts q downward to curb the
rent of high demand consumers. The upward distortion of q is for the purpose of counteracting
the downward distortion of q. In this regime, however, information rent has to be given to low
demand consumers to elicit them reporting their types truthfully. The information rent is a
decreasing function of high demand consumers’ consumption q, and so q has to be distorted
upward to reduce the information rent gained by low demand consumers.
When 0 < ω < ω1, the allocations remain at the countervailing incentives level: q = qCI and
q = qCI . The decrease in marginal cost ω demand further upward distortion on the consump-
tion of high demand consumers ( the consumption of low demand consumers will be distorted
downward accordingly ). Thus, the participation constraint of the low-type has to be slackened,
which means certain amount of information rent should be given to the consumers with low
willingness to pay. In this case, only IC(θ) and IR(θ) are binding constraints, the low-type
consumers get information rent G −∆θV (qCI). The incumbent firm keep reducing the tariffs
(t and t keep decreasing in this case) instead of distorting allocations to prevent low demand
consumers from bypassing and high demand consumers from misreporting.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of nonlinear pricing in the presence of network externalities,
under asymmetric information, and with the threat of entry. We give a full characterization of the
nonlinear pricing contract. We showed that in un-congestible network, network externalities and
asymmetric information together lead to a downward distortion for all consumers’ consumption
level; while in a congestible network, the consumptions of different types of consumers will be
distorted in opposite directions. It can be regarded as a generalization of Hahn (2003), Segal
(1999, 2003) and Csobra (2008).
We also analyzed the countervailing incentives issue resulted from the monopolist’s entry
deterring strategy. Entry deterrence appears to play a significant role in practice. Although
the potential entrants have not yet formed their own consumers network, their low production
cost can make them rivals to the incumbent monopolist. We discuss in detail how the entrants’
marginal cost affects the pricing strategy of the incumbent. When the marginal cost is relative
high, the pricing strategy is unaffected. As their competitiveness becoming sharper, the con-
sumptions are less distorted, and there is no distortion (ω ∈ (ω1, ω2)) in some interval for both
types. When the marginal cost is low enough, the consumptions remain at the countervailing
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incentives level. Thus, the interdependency of both types is a notable feature which is different
from the classical network bypassing literature.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma:
First note that the participation constraint IRi will be automatically satisfied for all types
i > 2 if the constraints IR1 and ICi1 are satisfied since
Ui > U1 + (θi − θ1)V (q1) > U1 > 0.
Adding the constraints
ICij : Ui > Uj + (θi − θj)V (qj)
and
ICji : Uj > Ui + (θj − θi)V (qi),
we have
(θi − θj)[V (qi)− V (qj)] > 0.
Thus, in order to get an implementable mechanism, the consumption q(θ) should be a non-
decreasing function in type. If i > j, the downward constraint ICij and the implementability
condition qi > qj imply the upward constraint ICji, but not vice versa. Thus only the downward
ICs are binding. Adding
ICi(i−1) : Ui > Ui−1 +∆θV (qi−1)
and
IC(i−1)(i−2) : Ui−1 > Ui−2 +∆θV (qi−2),
we have
Ui > Ui−2 +∆θ [V (qi−1) + V (qi−2)] > Ui−2 + (θi − θi−2)V (qi−2),
in which the second inequality is ensured by the implementability condition. So the local incen-
tive compatible constraints imply the non-local ones.
Proof of proposition 1:
The first order condition to (5) is:
Πq(q, α) = 0, (15)
that implies, 
αV ′(q) + Ψ′
(
vq + (1− v)q) = c,
θV ′(q) + Ψ′
(
vq + (1− v)q) = c. (16)
16
Differentiating (15) with respect to parameter α, we get:
Πqq
dq
dα
+Πqα = 0 (17)
that is, αvV ′′(q) + v2Ψ′′(Q) v(1− v)Ψ′′(Q)
v(1− v)Ψ′′(Q) (1− v)θV ′′(q) + (1− v)2Ψ′′(Q)
 dqdα
dq
dα
+
 vV ′(q)
0
 =
 0
0

Solving the above equations, we have
dq
dα
=
−V ′(q) [θV ′′(q) + (1− v)Ψ′′(Q)]
αV ′′(q)
[
θV ′′(q) + (1− v)Ψ′′(Q)]+ vθV ′′(q)Ψ′′(Q)
dq
dα
=
vV ′(q)Ψ′′(Q)
αV ′′(q)
[
θV ′′(q) + (1− v)Ψ′′(Q)]+ vθV ′′(q)Ψ′′(Q)
dQ
dα
= v
dq
dα
+ (1− v) dq
dα
=
−vθV ′(q)V ′′(q)
αV ′′(q)
[
θV ′′(q) + (1− v)Ψ′′(Q)
]
+ vθV ′′(q)Ψ′′(Q)
. (18)
From the fact that the Hessian matrix Πqq is negative definite, it can be verified that the 2th
diagonal element of Πqq is negative, and thus
θV ′′(q) + (1− v)Ψ′′(Q) < 0 (19)
and the determinant of Πqq is positive,
det(Πqq) = v(1− v)
{
αV ′′(q)
[
θV ′′(q) + (1− v)Ψ′′(Q)]+ vθV ′′(q)Ψ′′(Q)} > 0. (20)
The signs of derivatives in (18) can be determined, which are
dq
dα > 0 and
dQ
dα > 0. That means
qSB < qFB and QSB < QFB. The sign of dqdα depends on the sign of Ψ
′′(Q): if Ψ′′(Q) > 0, dqdα > 0,
then qSB < qFB; if Ψ′′(Q) < 0, dqdα > 0, then q
SB > qFB.
Proof of proposition 2:
Expression (9) can be attained directly from the first order condition of (8). The weakly
hazard rate property H ′(θ) 6 0 ensures the implementability conditions qSBi 6 qSBi+1,∀i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , n}, and the negative definiteness of Hessian matrix Πqq ensures the second order
sufficient condition of optimization. Thus (9) gives the second-best consumptions. The second
best information rents and tariffs can be attained accordingly.
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Proof of proposition 3:
Let
Γ ≡

[θ1 + ²H(θ1)] f(θ1)V ′′(q1)
[θ2 + ²H(θ2)] f(θ2)V ′′(q2)
. . .
[θn + ²H(θn)] f(θn)V ′′(qn)

γ ≡ (f(θ1), f(θ2), ...., f(θn))T .
Then
Πqq ≡ Γ + Ψ′′(Q)γγT (21)
Πq² ≡
(
H(θ1)f(θ1)V ′(q1),H(θ2)f(θ2)V ′(q2), ...., H(θn)f(θn)V ′(qn)
)T
(22)
The fist-order condition to (8) is Πq = 0. The negative definiteness of Hessian matrix Πqq
acts as the second-order sufficient condition of the principal’s optimization program, and the
monotone hazard rate property ensures the implementable conditions qi+1 > qi,∀i.
Differentiating the above first-order condition with respect to parameter ², we attain
Πqq
dq
d²
+Πq² = 0, (23)
which implies
dq
d²
= −(Πqq)−1Πq². (24)
Substituting expressions (21) and (22) into the above expression, we have
dq
d²
= −
[
Γ + Ψ′′(Q)γγ′
]−1
Πq² = −
[
Γ−1 −Ψ′′(Q) Γ
−1γ · γ′Γ−1
1 + Ψ′′(Q)γ′Γ−1γ
]
Πq². (25)
The ith elements of the LHS is then given by
dqi
d²
=− H(θi)V
′(qi)
[θi + ²H(θi)]V ′′(qi)
+
1
[θi + ²H(θi)]V ′′(qi)
 Ψ
′′(Q)
∑n
j=1
H(θj)f(θj)V
′(qj)
[θj+²H(θj)]V ′′(qj)
1 + Ψ′′(Q)
∑n
j=1
f(θj)
[θj+²H(θj)]V ′′(qj)

=
ρ−H(θi)V ′(qi)
[θi + ²H(θi)]V ′′(qi)
,
(26)
where
ρ ≡
Ψ′′(Q)
∑n
j=1
f(θj)H(θj)V
′(qj)
[θj+²H(θj)]V ′′(qj)
1 + Ψ′′(Q)
∑n
j=1
f(θj)
[θj+²H(θj)]V ′′(qj)
.
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Note that the Hessian matrix Πqq and hence its inverse Π−1qq are negative definite. So for
non-zero vector γ we have
γTΠ−1qq γ = γ
T
[
Γ−1 −Ψ′′(Q) Γ
−1γ · γTΓ−1
1 + Ψ′′(Q)γTΓ−1γ
]
γ
=
γTΓ−1γ
1 + Ψ′′(Q)γTΓ−1γ
< 0.
V ′′(·) < 0 implies every element of the diagonal matrix Γ−1 is negative, so γTΓ−1γ < 0, and
thus the denominator of ρ is positive, namely,
1 + Ψ′′(Q)γTΓ−1γ = 1 +Ψ′′(Q)
n∑
j=1
f(θj)
[θj + αH(θj)]V ′′(qj)
> 0.
The sign of ρ and hence the sign of dqid² are determined by the sign of Ψ
′′(Q).
1. If Ψ′′(Q) > 0, then ρ < 0, dqid² > 0, which implies q
SB
i < q
FB
i .
2. If Ψ′′(Q) < 0, then ρ > 0. From conditions H ′(θ) 6 0, qi 6 qi+1, and V ′′(·) < 0, we get
H(θ1)V ′(q1) > H(θ2)V ′(q2) > · · · > H(θn)V ′(qn), then we have the following inequalities:
0 = H(θn)V ′(qn) < ρ <
∑n
j=1
f(θj)H(θj)V
′(qj)
[θj+αH(θj)]V ′′(qj)∑n
j=1
f(θj)
[θj+αH(θj)]V ′′(qj)
< H(θ1)V ′(q1).
Then there exists a unique i∗ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} such that, when i > i∗, we have ρ >
H(θi)V ′(qi), dqid² < 0, and consequently q
SB
i > q
FB
i ; when i < i
∗, we have ρ < H(θi)V ′(qi),
dqi
d² > 0, and consequently q
SB
i < q
FB
i .
The derivative of Q with respective to ² is
dQ
d²
=
n∑
i=1
{
[ρ−H(θi)V ′(qi)] f(θi)
[θi + ²H(θi)]V ′′(qi)
}
=
Ψ′′(Q)
∑n
j=1
f(θj)H(θj)V
′(qj)
[θj+²H(θj)]V ′′(qj)
1 + Ψ′′(Q)
∑n
j=1
f(θj)
[θj+²H(θj)]V ′′(qj)
n∑
i=1
f(θi)
[θi + ²H(θi)]V ′′(qi)
−
n∑
i=1
f(θi)H(θi)V ′(qi)
[θi + ²H(θi)]V ′′(qi)
= −
∑n
i=1
f(θi)H(θi)V
′(qi)
[θi+²H(θi)]V ′′(qi)
1 + Ψ′′(Q)
∑n
i=1
f(θi)
[θi+²H(θi)]V ′′(qi)
> 0.
(27)
Thus, we have QSB < QFB for both cases.
Proof of Proposition 4:
In (P5), we have as many regimes as combinations of binding constraints among IR(θ),
IR(θ), IC(θ) and IC(θ). To reduce the number of possible cases, we first give the following
lemmas.
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Lemma 2 A pooling contract with q = q and t = t can never be optimal.
Proof. Suppose that the optimal contract is pooling with q = q = q and t = t = t. There are
two cases to be considered.
(i) θV ′(q) > c. Then, increase q by ε and the transfer by θV ′(q)ε, the θ−type consumers can
remain indifferent. Since at (q, t) the marginal rate of substitution between q and t is higher for
θ−type consumers, this new allocation is incentive compatible. This raises the firm’s revenue
by (1− v)[θV ′(q)− c]ε.
(ii) θV ′(q) 6 c and θV ′(q) < c. Then, decrease q by ε and adjust t so that θ−type consumers
can remain on the same indifference curve. Then the firm’s total charge will be increased by
[c− θV ′(q)]ε.
Thus, in both cases, it contradicts with the fact (q, t) is optimal contract.
Lemma 3 If the two types of consumers are offered two different contracts, the two incentive
constraints cannot be simultaneously bindings.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that both ICs are binding. From θV (q)− t+Ψ(Q) =
θV (q)− t+Ψ(Q) and θV (q)− t+Ψ(Q) = θV (q)− t+Ψ(Q), we have q = q and t = t. But this
is impossible by Lemma 1.
Lemma 4 The IC and IR constraints of the same type cannot be simultaneously slack.
Proof. If IR(θ) and IC(θ) are both slack, increase t(θ) by a tiny increment will not violate all
the constraints, but the firm’s charge will be increased.
Applying the above three lemmas, only five possible regimes are needed to be considered,
which are summarized in the following table.
Table1 – The five possible regimes
Constraints Regime1 Regime2 Regime3 Regime4 Regime5
IR(θ) B B B B S
IR(θ) S B B B B
IC(θ) S S S B B
IC(θ) B B S S S
Where “B” denotes “binding” and “S” denotes “slack”.
The regimes are ordered from 1 to 5 when ∆G increases, and ∆G itself is determined by the
entrants’ marginal cost ω. To find how ω affects the nonlinear pricing contract of the incumbent
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firm, we give the following two lemmas. Lemma 5 states the the variation of ∆G in different
regimes, and Lemma 6 shows how ∆G is determined by ω.
Lemma 5 The optimal pricing contracts and the utility difference ∆G in different regimes are:
1. In regime 1, the optimal solution to (P5) is q = qSB, q = qSB, U = G, and
U = G+∆θV (qSB). The value of utility difference satisfies ∆G < ∆θV (qSB).
2. In regime 2, the optimal consumption level q and q are determined by
q = V −1
(
∆G
∆θ
)
θV ′(q) + Ψ′
(
vq + (1− v)q) = c, (28)
where q ∈ [qSB, qFB] and q ∈ [qFB, qSB]. The consumers’ information rents
are U = G and U = G. The utility difference satisfies ∆θV (qSB) 6 ∆G 6
∆θV (qFB).
3. In regime 3, the optimal solution to (P5) is q = qFB, q = qFB, U = G, U = G,
and ∆θV (qFB) < ∆G < θV (qFB).
4. In regime 4, the optimal consumption level q and q are determined by
q = V −1
(
∆G
∆θ
)
θV ′(q) + Ψ′
(
vq + (1− v)q) = c, (29)
where q ∈ [qCI , qFB] and q ∈ [qFB, qCI ]. The consumers’ information rents are
U = G and U = G. The utility difference satisfies ∆θV (qFB) 6 ∆G 6 ∆θV (qCI).
5. In regime 5, the optimal contract is q = qCI , q = qCI , U = G −∆θV (qCI), and
U = G. The utility difference ∆G > θV (qCI). qCI and qCI are determined by:
θV ′(qCI) + Ψ′
(
vqCI + (1− v)qCI) = c(
θ +
v
1− v∆θ
)
V ′(qCI) + Ψ′
(
vqCI + (1− v)qCI) = c. (30)
Proof.
• In regime 1, the constraints IR(θ) and IC(θ) are binding. Solving (P5) in the same way
as (P3), we get the second best solution{
q = qSB, q = qSB;U = G,U = G+∆θV (qSB)
}
,
with ∆G < ∆U = ∆θV (qSB).
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• In regime 2, the constraints IR(θ), IR(θ) and IC(θ) are binding. The optimal contract
set is thus given by{
(q, q, U, U) : ∆θV (q) = ∆G, θV (q) + Ψ′(Q) = c;U = G,U = G
}
.
Substituting IR(θ) and IR(θ) into the objective function , the Lagrange function of is
constructed as
L(q, q) = v
[
θV (q)− cq
]
+ (1− v)
[
θV (q)− cq
]
+Ψ(Q)−
[
vG+ (1− v)G
]
+ λ
[
∆G−∆θV (q)
]
,
where λ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of the binding constraint IC(θ). Then q and q are
determined by:

(
θ − λ
v
∆θ
)
V ′(q) + Ψ′
(
vq + (1− v)q) = c,
θV ′(q) + Ψ′
(
vq + (1− v)q) = c. (31)
Because θ − λv∆θ < θ, from formula (18) it is easy to verify that q < qFB and q > qFB.
Substituting IR(θ) and IC(θ) into the objective function of (P5) and letting δ > 0 be the
Lagrange multiplier associate with the binding constraint IR(θ), we obtain the following
Lagrange function:
L(q, q) = v
[
θV (q)− cq
]
+ (1− v)
[
θV (q)− cq
]
+Ψ(Q)−
[
vG+ (1− v)(G+∆θV (q))
]
+ δ
[
∆θV (q)−∆G
]
.
The optimal consumptions q and q are determined by:

(
θ − 1− v − δ
v
∆θ
)
V ′(q) + Ψ′
(
vq + (1− v)q) = c,
θV ′(q) + Ψ′
(
vq + (1− v)q) = c. (32)
Because θ − 1−v−δv ∆θ > θ − 1−vv ∆θ, from expression (18) we have q > qSB and q < qSB.
It then suffice to show that ∆θV (qSB) 6 ∆G 6 ∆θV (qFB).
• In regime 3, IR(θ) and IR(θ) are binding. Then the optimal contract is given by{
q = qFB, q = qFB;U = G,U = G
}
.
From the slack ICs, we can verify that ∆G satisfies ∆θV (qFB) < ∆G < ∆θV (qFB).
22
• In regime 4, IR(θ) IR(θ) and IC(θ) are binding. The optimal contract is:{
(q, q, U, U) : ∆θV (q) = ∆G, θV (q) + Ψ′(Q) = c;U = G,U = G
}
.
Substituting IR(θ) and IR(θ) into the objective function, and letting µ > 0 the multiplier
associate with the binding constraint IC(θ), we have the following Lagrange function:
L(q, q) = v
[
θV (q)− cq
]
+ (1− v)
[
θV (q)− cq
]
+Ψ(Q)−
[
vG+ (1− v)G
]
+ µ
[
∆θV (q)−∆G
]
.
Thus, q and q are determined by
θV ′(q) + Ψ′
(
vq + (1− v)q) = c,(
θ +
µ
1− v∆θ
)
V ′(q) + Ψ′
(
vq + (1− v)q) = c. (33)
Substituting IR(θ) and IC(θ) into the objective function, and letting η > 0 be the multi-
plier associate with the binding constraint IR(θ), we have the Lagrange function:
L(q, q) = v
[
θV (q)− cq
]
+ (1− v)
[
θV (q)− cq
]
+Ψ(Q)
−
[
v(G−∆θV (q)) + (1− v)G
]
+ η
[
∆G−∆θV (q)
]
.
Then the q and q are determined by:
θV ′(q) + Ψ′
(
vq + (1− v)q) = c,(
θ +
v − η
1− v∆θ
)
V ′(q) + Ψ′
(
vq + (1− v)q) = c. (34)
To compare the different consumption levels, we make some comparative static analysis.
To do so, let 
θV ′(q) + Ψ′
(
vq + (1− v)q) = c,
βV ′(q) + Ψ′
(
vq + (1− v)q) = c. (35)
If β = θ, it’s the expression of qFB and qFB; if β = θ + v1−v∆θ, it coincides with the
countervailing incentives solution qCI and qCI .
Differentiating these two equations with respect to β leads to:
[
θV ′′(q) + vΨ′′(Q)
] dq
dβ
+ (1− v)Ψ′′(Q) dq
dβ
= 0,
vΨ′′(Q)
dq
dβ
+ [βV ′′(q) + (1− v)Ψ′′(Q)] dq
dβ
= −V ′(q).
(36)
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Thus, when Ψ′′(Q) < 0 we have
dq
dβ
=
(1− v)V ′(q)Ψ′′(Q)
βV ′′(q)[θV ′′(q) + vΨ′′(Q)] + (1− v)θV ′′(q)Ψ′′(Q) < 0,
dq
dβ
=
−V ′(q)[θV ′′(q) + vΨ′′(Q)]
βV ′′(q)[θV ′′(q) + vΨ′′(Q)] + (1− v)θV ′′(q)Ψ′′(Q) > 0.
(37)
Because θ + µ1−v∆θ > θ and θ +
v−η
1−v∆θ < θ +
v
1−v∆θ, from formula (37), it can be
verified that q > qFB, q < qFB, q < qCI , and q > qCI . Thus, ∆G = ∆θV (q) ∈
[∆θV (qFB),∆θV (qCI)].
• In regime 5, IR(θ) and IC(θ) are binding constraints. Substituting U = G and U =
G−∆θV (q) into the objective function, we obtain the following first order conditions:
θV ′(q) + Ψ′
(
vq + (1− v)q) = c,(
θ +
v
1− v∆θ
)
V ′(q) + Ψ′
(
vq + (1− v)q) = c. (38)
It is the countervailing incentives consumption level. Note that θ + v1−v∆θ > θ, and
thus, from (37) qFB > qCI , qFB < qCI . The difference of reservation utility satisfies
∆G > ∆U = ∆θV (qCI).
Figures 1-5 give a graphical depiction of the above five regimes.
Lemma 6 Suppose V (0) = 0, V ′(·) > 0, V ′′(·) < 0, and V (·) satisfies the standard Inada
conditions: limq→+∞V ′(q) = 0, and limq→0V ′(q) = +∞. Then the utility difference across
different states ∆G = G−G is a decreasing function of the marginal cost ω, limω→0∆G = +∞,
and limω→+∞∆G = 0.
Proof. The first order condition of G(θ) = maxq [θV (q)− ωq] is given by θV ′(q∗) = ω. So the
maximized utility derived from network bypassing is: G(θ) = θ[V (q∗(θ))− q∗(θ)V ′(q∗(θ))]. Let
Φ(q) = V (q) − qV ′(q). Then ∆G = G(θ) − G(θ) = θΦ(q∗) − θΦ(q∗), and its derivative with
respect to marginal cost ω is:
d∆G
dω
= θΦ′(q∗)
dq∗
dω
− θΦ′(q∗)dq
∗
dω
= −θq∗V ′′(q∗)dq
∗
dω
+ θq∗V ′′(q∗)
dq∗
dω
= −θq∗V ′′(q∗) 1
θV ′′(q∗)
+ θq∗V ′′(q∗)
1
θV ′′(q∗)
= −q∗ + q∗ < 0.
It is easy to verify that when the conditions V (0) = 0, V ′(·) > 0, V ′′(·) < 0, limq→+∞V ′(q) = 0,
and limq→0V ′(q) = +∞ are satisfied, limω→0∆G = +∞ and limω→+∞∆G = 0. Figure 6 in
appendix F depicts the relationship of ∆G and ω.
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From the above lemmas, one can see that if the potential entrants’ competitiveness increases,
the utility differences will increase from zero to infinity. Thus, there exist positive values ωi, i =
1, 2, 3, 4, such that ω1 < ω2 < ω3 < ω4 corresponding to ∆θV (qCI), ∆θV (qFB), ∆θV (qFB) and
∆θV (qSB), respectively, where qCI , qFB, qFB and qSB are given in expressions (14), (3) and (4).
Thus, combining Lemmas 5 and 6, we can easily prove the statement in Proposition 4. Figure
7 depicts the change of consumptions with ω.
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